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Abstract—This work considers secure transmission protocol for
flexible load-balance control in two-hop relay wireless networks
without the information of both eavesdropper channels and
locations. The available secure transmission protocols via relay
cooperation in physical layer secrecy framework cannot provide a
flexible load-balance control, which may significantly limit their
application scopes. This paper extends the conventional works
and proposes a general transmission protocol with considering
load-balance control, in which the relay is randomly selected
from the first k preferable assistant relays located in the circle
area with the radius r and the center at the middle between
source and destination (2HR-(r, k) for short). This protocol covers
the available works as special cases, like ones with the optimal
relay selection (r = ∞, k = 1) and with the random relay
selection (r = ∞, k = n i.e. the number of system nodes) in
the case of equal path-loss, ones with relay selected from relay
selection region (r ∈ (0,∞), k = 1) in the case of distance-
dependent path-loss. The theoretic analysis is further provided to
determine the maximum number of eavesdroppers one network
can tolerate to ensure a desired performance in terms of the
secrecy outage probability and transmission outage probability.
The analysis results also show the proposed protocol can balance
load distributed among the relays by a proper setting of r and k
under the premise of specified secure and reliable requirements.
Index Terms—Two-Hop Wireless Networks, Relay Cooper-
ation, Physical Layer Secrecy, Transmission outage, Secrecy
Outage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have the promising applications of in
many important scenarios (like battlefield networks, emer-
gency networks, disaster recovery networks). However, Due to
the energy constrained and broadcast properties, the considera-
tion of secrecy and lifetime optimization in such networks is of
great importance for ensuring the high transmission efficiency
and confidentiality requirements of these applications. Two-
hop wireless networks, as a building block for large multi-
hop network system, have been a class of basic and important
networking scenarios [1]. The analysis and design of transmis-
sion protocol in basic two-hop relay networks serves as the
foundation for secure information exchange of general multi-
hop network system.
For the lifetime optimization, an uneven use of the nodes
may cause some nodes die much earlier, thus creating holes
in the network, or worse, leaving the network disconnected,
which is critical in military or emergency networks. For this
problem, a lot of protocols were proposed to balance the traffic
across the various relay nodes and avoids overloading any
relay node in various wireless networks, especially energy con-
strained wireless environments (like wireless sensor networks)
[7-16](see Section V for related works). We notice there is
tradeoff between the load-balance capacity and transmission
efficiency and still no approaches can flexibly control it.
Regarding the secrecy, the traditional cryptographic approach
can provide a standard information security. However, the
everlasting secrecy can not be achieved by such approach,
because the adversary can record the transmitted messages and
try any way to break them [12]. Especially, recent advances
in high-performance computation (e.g. quantum computing)
further complicate acquiring long-lasting security via cryp-
tographic approaches [13]. This motivates the consideration
of signaling scheme in physical layer secrecy framework to
provide a strong form of security, where a degraded signal
at an eavesdropper is always ensured such that the original
data can be hardly recovered regardless of how the signal is
processed at the eavesdropper [14][15][16].
The secure and reliable transmission in physical layer
secrecy framework for two-hop relay wireless networks has
been studied and a lot of secure transmission protocols were
proposed in [17-28](see Section V for related works). These
works mainly focus on the maximum secrecy capacity and
minimum energy consumption, in which the system node with
the best link condition to source and destination is selected as
information relay. These protocols are attractive in the sense
that provides very effective resistance against eavesdroppers.
However, since the channel state is relatively constant during a
fixed time period, some relay nodes with good link conditions
always prefer to relay packages, which results in a severe
load-balance problem and a quick node energy depletion.
Such, these protocol is not suitable for energy-limited wireless
networks (like wireless sensor networks). In order to realize
load-balance, Y. Shen et al. further proposed a random relay
selection protocol [29][30], in which the relay node is random
selected from the system nodes. However, this protocol has
lower transmission efficiency. Such, it is only suitable for
large scale wireless network environment with stringent energy
consumption constraint.
In summary, the available secure transmission protocols
cannot provide a flexible load-balance control, which may
2significantly limit their application scopes. This paper extends
conventional secure cooperative transmission protocols to a
general case to enable the load-balance to be flexibly con-
trolled in the two-hop relay wireless networks without the
knowledge of eavesdropper channels and locations. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• This paper proposes a new transmission protocol 2HR-
(r, k) for two-hop relay wireless network without the
knowledge eavesdropper channels and locations, where
the relay is randomly selected from the first k preferable
assistant relays located in the circle area with the radius
r and the center at the middle between source and
destination. This protocol is general protocol, and can
flexibly control the tradeoff between the load-balance
among relays and the transmission efficiency by a proper
setting of k and r under the premise of specified secure
and reliable requirements.
• In case that the path-loss is identical between all pairs
of nodes, theoretic analysis of 2HR-(r, k) protocol is
provided to determine the corresponding exact results on
the number of eavesdroppers one network can tolerate to
satisfy a specified requirement and shows that the 2HR-
(r, k) protocol covers all the available secure transmission
protocols as special cases, like ones with the optimal relay
selection (r = ∞, k = 1) [19][20][27][29] and with the
random relay selection (d = ∞, k = n i.e. the number
of system nodes)[29][30].
• In case that the path-loss between each pair of nodes
also depends on the distance between them, a coordinate
system is presented and the theoretic analysis of 2HR-
(r, k) protocol is provided to determine the correspond-
ing exact results on the number of eavesdroppers one
network can tolerate to satisfy a specified requirement
and shows that the 2HR-(r, k) protocol covers all the
available secure transmission protocols as special cases,
like ones with relay selected from relay selection region
(r ∈ (0,∞), k = 1)[30].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents system models and the 2HR-(r, k) protocol. Section
III presents the theoretic analysis in case of equal path-loss
between all node pairs. Section IV presents the theoretic
analysis in case that path-loss between each node pair also
depends on their relative locations. Section V is related works
and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND 2HR-(r, k) PROTOCOL
A. Network Model
A Two-hop wireless network scenario is considered where
a source node S wishes to communicate securely with its des-
tination node D with the help of multiple relay nodes R1, R2,
· · · , Rn. Also present in the environment are m eavesdroppers
E1, E2, · · · , Em without knowledge of channels and locations.
The relay nodes and eavesdroppers are independent and also
uniformly distributed in the network, as illustrated in Fig.1.
Our goal here is to design a general protocol to ensure the
secure and reliable information transmission from source S to
S D
R5
R1
R3 R4
R2
E1
E5
E2 E3
E4
Fig. 1. System scenario: Source S wishes to communicate securely with
destination D with the assistance of finite relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn (n=5 in
the figure) in the presence of passive eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em (m=5
in the figure). Cooperative relay scheme is used in the two-hop transmission.
destination D and provide flexible load-balance control among
the relays.
B. Transmission Model
Consider the transmission from a transmitter A to a receiver
B, and denote the ith symbol transmitted by node A by x(A)i .
We assume that all nodes transmit with the same power Es
and path-loss between all pairs of nodes is independent. We
denote the frequency-nonselective multi-path fading from A
to B by hA,B . Under the condition that all nodes in a group
of nodes, R, are generating noises, the ith signal received at
node B from node A, denoted by y(B)i , is determined as:
y
(B)
i =
hA,B
d
α/2
A,B
√
Esx
(A)
i +
∑
Aj∈R
hAj ,B
d
α/2
Aj ,B
√
Esx
(Aj)
i + n
(B)
i
where dA,B is the distance between node A and B, α ≥ 2
is the path-loss exponent, |hA,B|2 is exponentially distributed
and without loss of generality, we assume that E
[
|hA,B|2
]
=
1. The noise n(B)i at receiver B is assumed to be i.i.d complex
Gaussian random variables with mean N0. The SINR CA,B
from A to B is then given by
CA,B =
Es |hA,B|2 d−αA,B∑
Aj∈REs
∣∣hAj,B∣∣2 d−αAj ,B +N0/2
For a legitimate node and an eavesdropper, we use two
separate SINR thresholds γR and γE to define the minimum
SINR required to recover the transmitted messages for legiti-
mate node and eavesdropper, respectively. Therefore, a system
node (the selected relay or destination) is able to decode
a packet if and only if its received SINR is greater than
γR, whereas each eavesdropper try to achieve target SINR
γE to recover the transmitted message. However, from an
information-theoretic perspective, we can map to a secrecy
rate formulation R ≥ 12 log(1 + γR) − 12 log(1 + γE) [31].
Hence, we can also think the γR and γE can be set by the
desired secrecy rate of the system.
C. 2HR-(r, k) Protocol
Notice the available transmission protocols have their own
advantages and disadvantages in terms of the transmission
efficiency and energy consumption, and thus are suitable for
3different network scenarios. With respect to these protocols
as special cases, a general transmission protocol 2HR-(r, k) is
proposed to control the balance of load distributed among the
relays and works as follows.
1) Relay selection region determination: The circle area,
with radius r and the center at the middle point between
source S and destination D, is determined as relay
selection region.
2) Channel measurement: The source S and destination
D broadcast a pilot signal to allow each relay to mea-
sure the channel from S and D to itself. The relays,
which receive the pilot signal, can accurately calculate
hS,Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n and hD,Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3) Candidate relay selection: The relays with the first k
large min
(
|hS,Rrj |2, |hD,Rrj |2
)
form the candidate relay
set R. Here, Rrj denotes the j-th relay node in the relay
selection region.
4) Relay selection: The relay, indexed by j∗, is selected
randomly from candidate relay set R. Using the same
method with Step 2, each of the other relays Rj , j =
1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗ in network exactly knows hRj ,Rj∗ .
5) Two-Hop transmission: The source S transmits the
message to Rj∗ , and concurrently, the relay nodes with
indexes in R1 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
transmit
noise to generate interference at eavesdroppers. The
relay Rj∗ then transmits the message to destination
D, and concurrently, the relay nodes with indexes in
R2 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,D|2 < τ
}
transmit noise to gener-
ate interference at eavesdroppers.
Remark 1: The load is completely balanced among the
relays in the candidate relay set R whose size is determined
by parameter r and k in the 2HR-(r, k) protocol. Notice that a
too larger r and k may lead to larger size of the candidate relay
set R. Thus, the load-balance can be flexibly controlled by a
proper setting of the parameter r and k in terms of network
performance requirements.
Remark 2: The parameter τ involved in the 2HR-(r, k)
protocol serves as the threshold on path-loss, based on which
the set of noise generating relay nodes can be identified.
Notice that a too large τ may disable legitimate transmission,
while a too small τ may not be sufficient for interrupting all
eavesdroppers. Thus, the parameter τ should be set properly to
ensure both secrecy requirement and reliability requirement.
Remark 3: In the case that there is equal path-loss between
all pairs of nodes, i.e., dA,B = 1 for all A 6= B, the channel
state information is independent of the parameter r in 2HR-
(r, k) protocol. Since the parameter r is no effect on relay
selection, the relay selection region is the whole network area
with r = ∞. Therefore, 2HR-(r, k) protocol is castrated as
2HR-(∞, k) in case of equal path-loss between all node pairs.
D. Transmission Outage and Secrecy Outage
For a Two-hop relay transmission from the source S to
destination D, we call transmission outage happens if D can
not receive the transmitted packet. We define the transmission
outage probability, denoted by P (T )out , as the probability that
transmission outage from S to D happens. For a predefined
upper bound εt on P (T )out , we call the communication between
S and D is reliable if P (T )out ≤ εt. Similarly, we define the
transmission outage events O(T )S→Rj∗ and O
(T )
Rj∗→D for the
transmissions from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and from Rj∗
to D, respectively. Due to the link independence assumption,
we have
P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
) (1)
Regarding the secrecy outage, we call secrecy outage
happens for a transmission from S to D if at least one
eavesdropper can recover the transmitted packets during the
process of this two-hop transmission. We define the secrecy
outage probability, denoted by P (S)out , as the probability that
secrecy outage happens during the transmission from S to D.
For a predefined upper bound εs on P (S)out , we call the commu-
nication between S and D is secure if P (S)out ≤ εs. Similarly,
we define the secrecy outage events O(S)S→Rj∗ and O
(S)
Rj∗→D
for the transmissions from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and
from Rj∗ to D, respectively. Due to the link independence
assumption, we have
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
) (2)
III. EQUAL PATH-LOSS BETWEEN ALL NODE PAIRS
In this section, we analyze 2HR-(r, k) protocol in the case
where the path-loss is equal between all pairs of nodes in the
system. The Remark 3 shows 2HR-(r, k) protocol is castrated
as 2HR-(∞, k) in case of equal path-loss between all node
pairs. We now analyze that under the 2HR-(∞, k) protocol
the number of eavesdroppers one network can tolerate subject
to specified requirements on transmission outage and secrecy
outage. The following two lemmas regarding some basic
properties of P (T )out , P
(S)
out and τ are first presented, which will
help us to derive the main result in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes, under the 2HR-
(r, k) protocol the transmission outage probability P (T )out and
secrecy outage probability P (S)out there satisfy the following
conditions.
P
(T )
out ≤ 2

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
−

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
2 (3)
4here Ψ = e−2γR(n−1)(1−e
−τ )τ
, and
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)]2 (4)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix A.
Lemma 2: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, to ensure P (T )out ≤ εt and
P
(S)
out ≤ εs under the 2HR-(r, k) protocol, the parameter τ
must satisfy the following condition.
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
and
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


here, ⌊·⌋ is the floor function.
Proof:
The parameter τ should be set properly to satisfy both
reliability and secrecy requirements.
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from formula (3) in the Lemma 1, that we just need
2

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
−

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
2
≤ εt
Thus,
1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
≤ 1−√1− εt (5)
Notice that
1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−i
]
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−i
]
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
)(n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−iΨj
]
(6)
We also notice the i can take from 0 to n− j, then we have
1 ≤
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
) ≤ n!
(n− j)!j!
Substituting into formula (6), we have
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
)(n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−iΨj
]
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−Ψj ·
n−j∑
i=0
(
n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−i
]
= 1− 1
k
k∑
j=1
Ψj
= 1− 1
k
[ k∑
j=0
1(
k
j
)(k
j
)
Ψj − 1
]
≤ 1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
Ψj − 1
]
= 1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (1 + Ψ)k − 1]
(7)
According to formula (5), (6) and (7), in order to ensure
the reliability, we need
1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (1 + Ψ)k − 1] ≤ 1−√1− εt
or equally,
Ψ ≥
[(
k
⌊k2 ⌋
)(
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1
that is,
e−2γR(n−1)·(1−e
−τ )τ ≥
[(
k
⌊k2 ⌋
)(
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1
Therefore
(
1− e−τ) τ ≤ − log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
• Secrecy Guarantee
To ensure the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs, we know
from Lemma 1 that we just need
52m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )]2
≤ εs
Thus,
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−√1− εs
That is,
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


Based on the results of Lemma 2, we now can establish the
following theorem regarding the performance of the proposed
protocol in case of equal path-loss between all node pairs.
Theorem 1. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes. To guarantee
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs under 2HR-(r, k) protocol, the
number of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate must
satisfy the following condition.
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)
√√√√√−(n−1) log


[
( k⌊ k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k −1


2γR
Proof:
From Lemma 2, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
(8)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γRτ
(9)
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
(10)
From formula (9) and (10), we can get
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)− log


[
( k⌊k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k −1


2γRτ
(11)
By letting τ take its maximum value for maximum interfer-
ence at eavesdroppers, from formula (8) and (11), we get the
following bound
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)
√√√√√−(n−1) log


[
( k⌊ k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k −1


2γR
Based on the above analysis, by simple derivation, we can
get the follow corollary to show our proposal is a general
protocol.
Corollary 1. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes, the analysis results
of the proposed protocol is identical to that of protocols with
the optimal relay selection presented in [19][20] by setting of
k = 1 and r = ∞, and is identical to that of protocols with
the random relay selection presented in [29][30] by setting of
k = n and r =∞.
Remark 4: In case of equal path-loss of all pairs of nodes
and the parameter r = ∞, we notice that the larger k
means the better load-balance among the relays and the lower
transmission efficiency, and vice versa. In particular, when
k = 1, 2HR-(r, k) protocol has the worse load-balance among
the relays and the highest transmission efficiency, and when
k = n, 2HR-(r, k) protocol has the best load-balance among
the relays and the lower transmission efficiency.
IV. GENERAL CASE TO ADDRESSING PATH-LOSS
In this section, we consider the more general scenario where
the path-loss between each pair of nodes also depends on
the distance between them. The related theoretic analysis is
further provided to determine the number of eavesdroppers
one network can tolerant by adopting the 2HR-(r, k) protocol.
To address the distance-dependent path-loss, we consider a
coordination system shown in Fig 2, in which the two-hop
relay wireless networks employed in the 2-D plane of unit
area, consisting of the square [−0.5, 0.5] × [−0.5, 0.5]. The
source S located at coordinate (−0.5, 0) wishes to establish
two-hop transmission with destination D located at coordinate
(0.5, 0).
To address the near eavesdropper problem and also to
simply the analysis for the 2HR-(r, k) protocol, we assume
that there exits a constant d0 > 0 such that any eavesdropper
falling within a circle area with radius d0 and center S or
Rj∗ can eavesdrop the transmitted messages successfully with
6(-0.5,-0.5)
(0,0)
(0.5,-0.5)
S
D
(-0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)
d0
Rj*
Ei
Rj
Relay 
selected 
from this 
region
(x,y)
(xEi, yEi)
(xRj*, yRj*)
dx
dy
r(-0.5,0)
(0.5,0)
d0
Fig. 2. Coordinate system for the scenario where path-loss between pairs of
nodes is based on their relative locations.
probability 1, while any eavesdropper beyond such area can
only successfully eavesdropper the transmitted messages with
a probability less than 1. Based on such a simplification, we
can establish the following two lemmas regarding some basic
properties of P (T )out , P
(S)
out and τ under this protocol.
Lemma 3: Consider the network scenario of Fig 2, under the
2HR-(r, k) protocol the transmission outage probability P (T )out
and secrecy outage probability P (S)out there satisfy the following
condition.
P
(T )
out ≤ 1−Υϕ1+ϕ2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
− Υ
2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
k2
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
(12)
P
(S)
out ≤
2m
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)]
−
[
m
(
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
))]2
(13)
here,
Υ = e
−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ )
(0.5+r)−α
ϕ1 =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1
(x2 + y2)
α
2
dxdy
ϕ2 =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + y2
]α
2
dxdy
ψ =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the Appendix B.
Lemma 4: Consider the network scenario of Fig 2, to ensure
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs by applying 2HR-(r, k) protocol,
the parameter τ must satisfy the following condition.
τ ≤
√√√√√ − log
[
k2
√
ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν1
2ν2
]
γR (n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (0.5 + r)α
and
τ ≥ − log

1 +
log
(
1−√1−εs
m
−pid02
1−pid02
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γEψd0α)


here, ϕ1, ϕ2, and ψ are defined in the same way as that in
Lemma 3, and
ν1 = k
2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
ν2 = k
2
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
Proof:
The parameter τ should be set properly to satisfy both
reliability and secrecy requirements.
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from formula (12) in Lemma 3 that we just need
1−Υϕ1+ϕ2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
− Υ
2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
k2
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
≤ εt
Thus,
Υϕ1+ϕ2 ≥ k
2
√
ν12 + 4 (1− εt) ν2 − k2ν1
2ν2
here
ν1 = k
2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
7ν2 = k
2
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
That is,
e
−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)(ϕ1+ϕ2)
(0.5+r)−α
≥ k
2
√
ν12 + 4 (1− εt) ν2 − k2ν1
2ν2
Thus,
τ
(
1− e−τ) ≤ − log
[
k2
√
ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν1
2ν2
]
γR (n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (0.5 + r)α
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√ − log
[
k2
√
ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν1
2ν2
]
γR (n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (0.5 + r)α
• Secrecy Guarantee
To ensure the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs, we know
from formula (13) in Lemma 3 that we just need
2m
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)]
−
[
m
(
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
))]2
≤ εs
Thus,
m ·
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− pid02
)]
≤ 1−√1− εs
that is,
τ ≥ − log

1 +
log
(
1−√1−εs
m
−pid02
1−pid02
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γEψd0α)


Based on the results of Lemma 4, we now can establish the
following theorem regarding the performance of 2HR-(r, k)
protocol.
Theorem 2. Consider the network scenario of Fig 2. To
guarantee P (T )out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs based on the proposed
2HR-(r, k) protocol, the number of eavesdroppers m the
network can tolerate must satisfy the following condition.
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pid0
2 +
(
1− pid02
)
ω
here
ω =
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)
√√√√−(n−1) log [ k2√ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν12ν2
]
γR(ϕ1+ϕ2)(0.5+r)
α
ϕ1, ϕ2, ν1,ν2 and ψ are defined in the same way as that in
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Proof:
From Lemma 4, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√ − log
[
k2
√
ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν1
2ν2
]
γR (n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (0.5 + r)α
(14)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log
[
k2
√
ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν1
2ν2
]
γRτ (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (0.5 + r)
α
(15)
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
m ·
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)]
≤ 1−√1− εs
(16)
From formula (15) and (16), we can get
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pid0
2 +
(
1
1+γEψd0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pid0
2 +
(
1
1+γEψd0α
)− log [ k2√ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν12ν2 ]
γRτ(ϕ1+ϕ2)(0.5+r)
α (
1− pid02
)
(17)
By letting τ take its maximum value for maximum inter-
ference at eavesdroppers, from formula (14) and (17), we get
the following bound
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pid0
2 +
(
1− pid02
)
ω
here
8ω =
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)
√√√√−(n−1) log [ k2√ν12+4(1−εt)ν2−k2ν12ν2
]
γR(ϕ1+ϕ2)(0.5+r)
α
Remark 5: The parameter r determines the relay selection
region. When parameter r tends to 0, few system nodes locate
in relay selection region, and the relay selection process tends
to optimal from the view of relay selection region with less
load-balance capacity. With increasing of parameter r, the
more relays are in relay selection region, which can ensure
better load-balance.
Remark 6: The SINR at the receiver depends on channel
state information and the distance between the transmitter and
receiver. The Remark 4 and Remark 5 show that the parameter
r and k in 2HR-(r, k) protocol can be flexibly set to control
the tradeoff the load-balance and the transmission efficiency
in terms of channel state information and the distance between
the transmitter and receiver respectively.
Remark 7: In order to get the better load-balance, set a larger
r and k which will result in a lower transmission efficiency.
The Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 show that the number of
eavesdroppers one network can tolerant is decreasing as the
increasing r and k.
Remark 8: In the initial stage of the network operation, the
parameter r and k can be set small values to ensure the high
efficiency, since all relays are energetic which load-balance
among the relays is not first considered. With the passage of
time of the network operation, the parameter r and k can be
gradually set higher values for better load-balance among the
relays to extend the network lifetime.
Based on the above analysis, by simple derivation, we can
get the follow corollary to show our proposal is a general
protocol.
Corollary 2. Consider the network scenario of Fig 2, the
analysis results of the proposed protocol with r → ∞ and
k = n is identical to that of Protocol 3 with a = 0 and b = 0
(the parameters a and b determine the relay selection region)
proposed in [30], and the analysis results of the proposed
protocol with r → 0 and k = n is identical to that of Protocol
3 with a→ 0.5 and b→ 0.5 proposed in [30].
Remark 9: The protocol proposed in [30] have the ability
to control load-balance among the relays by only control on
the relay selection region. Whereas, 2HR-(r, k) protocol can
realize load-balance by control on both relay selection set and
relay selection region.
V. RELATED WORKS
A lot of research works have been dedicated to load-balance
transmission scheme for balanced energy consumption among
system nodes to prolong the network lifetime in wireless net-
works. A few dynamic load balancing strategies and schemes
were proposed in [2][3] for distributed systems. For wireless
mesh network, a multi-hop transmission scheme is proposed
in [4], in which information relay is selected based on the
current load of the relay nodes. For wireless access networks,
a distributed routing algorithm that performs dynamic load-
balance by constructs a load-balanced backbone tree [5]. J.
Gao et al. extended the shortest path routing to support load-
balance [6]. In particular, for energy constrained wireless sen-
sor networks, load-balance is significant important, and a lot of
transmission schemes were proposed for load-balance among
relays and prolonging the network lifetime [7][8][9]. Lifetime
optimization and security of multi-hop wireless networks was
further considered and the secure transmission scheme with
load-balance is proposed in [10][11].
Recently, attention is turning to achieve physical layer
secrecy and secure transmission scheme via cooperative relays
is considered in large wireless networks. Some transmission
protocols are proposed to select the optimal relay in terms of
the maximum secrecy capacity or minimum transmit power. In
case that eavesdropper channels or locations is known, node
cooperation is used to improve the performance of secure
wireless communications and a few cooperative transmission
protocols were proposed to jam eavesdroppers [17][18]. In
case that eavesdropper channels or locations is unknown, D.
Goeckel et al. proposed a transmission protocol based on
optimal relay selection [19][20]. For both one-dimensional and
two-dimensional networks, a secure transmission protocol is
proposed in [21]. Z. Ding et al. considered the opportunistic
use of relays and proposed two secrecy transmission protocols
[22]. The ”two-way secrecy scheme” was studied in [23]
[24] and M. Dehghan et al. explored the energy efficiency
of cooperative jamming scheme [25]. A. Sheikholeslami et al.
proposed a protocol, where the signal of a given transmitter
is protected by the aggregate interference produced by the
other transmitters [26]. A secure transmission protocol are
presented in case where the eavesdroppers collude [27]. J. Li
et al. proposed two secure transmission protocols to confound
the eavesdroppers [28]. The above works mainly focus on the
maximum the secrecy capacity, in which the system nodes
with best link condition is always selected as information
relay. Such, these protocols have less load-balance capacity. In
order to address this problem, Y. Shen et al. further proposed
a protocol with random relay selection in [29][30]. This
protocol can provide good load-balance capacity and balanced
energy consumption among the relays, whereas it has low
transmission efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a general 2HR-(r, k) protocol to ensure
secure and reliable information transmission through multiple
cooperative system nodes for two-hop relay wireless networks
without the knowledge of eavesdropper channels and locations.
We proved that the 2HR-(r, k) protocol has the capability of
flexible control over the tradeoff between the load-balance
capacity and the transmission efficiency by a proper setting
of the radius r of relay selection region and the size k of
candidate relay set. Such, in general it is possible for us to set
proper value of parameters according to network scenario to
support various applications. The results in this paper indicate
that the parameters r and k of the 2HR-(r, k) protocol do
also affect the number of eavesdroppers one networks can
9tolerant under the premise of specified secure and reliable
requirements.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof:
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
)
= P
(
Es · |hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 +N0/2
≤ γR
)
.
= P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 |hRj ,Rj∗ |2
≤ γR
)
≤ P
(
H
|R1|τ ≤ γR
)
= P (H ≤ γR|R1|τ)
Here, H = min
(|hS,Rj∗ |2, |hD,Rj∗ |2). Compared to the
noise generated by multiple system nodes, the environment
noise is negligible and thus is omitted here to simply the
analysis. Notice that R1 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
.
Employing Appendix C, we should have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ FH (γR|R1|τ)
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
·
[
1− e−2γR|R1|τ
]i [
e−2γR|R1|τ
]n−i ]
Since there are n− 1 other relays except Rj∗ , the expected
number of noise-generation nodes is given by |R1| = (n− 1)·
P
(|hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ) = (n− 1) (1− e−τ ). Then we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
·
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ
]i [
e−2γR(n−1)(1−e
−τ )τ
]n−i ]
For convenience of the description, let Ψ =
e−2γR(n−1)·(1−e
−τ )τ
, and we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
(18)
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
(19)
Substituting formula (18) and (19) into formula (1), we have
P
(T )
out ≤ 2

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
−

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
2
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability,
we know that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
Thus, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE) (20)
Based on the Markov inequality,
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ P
(
Es · |hS,Ei|2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Ei |2
≥ γE
)
= E{hRj,Ei ,j=0,1,··· ,n+mp,j 6=j∗},R1
P

|hS,Ei|2 > γE · ∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2




≤ ER1

 ∏
Rj∈R1
EhRj,Ei
[
e−γE |hRj,Ei |
2
]
= ER1
[(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|]
Substituting into formula (20), we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
= m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
(21)
employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
≤ m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R2|
(22)
Since the expected number of noise-generation nodes is
given by |R1| = |R2| = (n− 1) (1− e−τ ), thus, substituting
formula (21) and (22) into formula (2), we can get
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P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)]2
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof:
Notice that two ways leading to transmission outage are: 1)
there are no candidate relays in the relay selection region; 2)
the SINR at the selected relay or the destination is less than
γR. We also notice that if the number of the eligible relays in
candidate relay region less than or equal to k, the relay will
be random selected from candidate relay set R.
Let Al, l = 0, 1, · · · , n, be the event that there are just l
system nodes in the relay selection region. We have
P
(T )
out =
n∑
l=0
P
(T )
out|Al · P (Al) (23)
Since the relay is uniformly distributed, the number of relays
in candidate relay region is a binomial distribution
(
n, pir2
)
.
We have
P (Al) =
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l (24)
P
(T )
out|Al is discussed from the following three aspects.
1) l = 0
In this case, there are no relays in the relay selection region,
then, we have
P
(T )
out|Al = 1 (25)
2) 1 ≤ l ≤ k
Since the number of candidate relay nodes is less than
or equal to k. The relay selection process is to select relay
randomly in the candidate relay set R which consists of these
l relays located in the relay selection region.
Notice P (T )out|Al is determined as
P
(T )
out|Al = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
) (26)
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al
)
= P


Es ·
|hS,Rj∗ |
2
dα
S,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1 Es ·
|hRj,Rj∗ |2
dα
Rj,Rj∗
+ N02
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al


.
= P


|hS,Rj∗ |
2
dαS,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj,Rj∗ |2
dα
Rj,Rj∗
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al


Compared to the noise generated by multiple system
nodes, the environment noise is negligible and thus is
omitted here to simply the analysis. Notice that R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
, then
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ P
( |hS,Rj∗ |2d−αS,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1 τd
−α
Rj ,Rj∗
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al
)
Without loss of generality, Let (x, y) be the coordinate of
Rj , shown in Fig 2. The number of noise generation nodes
in square [x, x+ dx]× [y, y + dy] is (n− 1) (1− e−τ ) dxdy.
Then, we have
∑
Rj∈R1
τ
dαRj ,Rj∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )[(
x− xRj∗
)2
+
(
y − yRj∗
)2]α2 dxdy
where
(
xRj∗ , yRj∗
)
is the coordinate of the selected relay
Rj∗ which locates in the relay selection region. Because the
relays are uniformly distributed, it is the worst case that
the selected relay Rj∗ is located on the point (0, 0), where
the interference at Rj∗ from the noise generation nodes is
largest, and the best case with the selected relay Rj∗ located
in the edge of the circular relay selection region, where the
interference at Rj∗ from the noise generation nodes is lowest.
Then, we consider the worst case and have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ P
( |hS,Rj∗ |2d−αS,Rj∗
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1 ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al
)
here,
ϕ1 =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1
(x2 + y2)
α
2
dxdy
Due to 0.5− r ≤ dS,Rj∗ ≤ 0.5 + r, then,
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P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2 (0.5 + r)−α
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1 ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al
)
= P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2 ≤
γRτ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1
(0.5 + r)−α
∣∣∣∣Al
)
= 1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)ϕ1
(0.5+r)−α
For convenience of description, let Υ = e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ )
(0.5+r)−α ,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ 1−Υϕ1 (27)
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ 1−Υϕ2 (28)
here,
ϕ2 =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + y2
]α
2
dxdy
Substituting formula (27) and (28) into formula (26), we
have
P
(T )
out|Al ≤ [1−Υ
ϕ1 ] + [1−Υϕ2 ]− [1−Υϕ1] [1−Υϕ2 ]
= 1−Υϕ1+ϕ2
(29)
3) k < l ≤ n
In this case, the relay selection process is to select relay
randomly in the candidate relay set R which consists of the
relays with the first k large min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2) in the
relay selection region.
Notice P (T )out|Al is determined as
P
(T )
out|Al = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
) (30)
Let the random variable H = min
(|hS,Rj∗ |2, |hD,Rj∗ |2)
and from Appendix C, the distribution function of H is
FH (x) =


1
k
k∑
j=1
[
l∑
i=l−j+1
(
l
i
)
[
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]l−i ] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
(31)
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
employing the similar method above, we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2 (0.5 + r)−α
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1 ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ P
(
H ≤ γRτ (n− 1) (1− e
−τ )ϕ1
(0.5 + r)
−α
∣∣∣∣Al
)
From formula (31), we can get
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[ l∑
i=l−j+1
(
l
i
)(
1−Υ2ϕ1)i · (Υ2ϕ1)l−i ]
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
l−j∑
i=0
(
l
i
)
(
l−j
i
)(l − j
i
)(
1−Υ2ϕ1)i ·
(
Υ2ϕ1
)l−j−i (
Υ2ϕ1
)j ]
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1− (Υ2ϕ1)j ]
= 1− 1
k
k∑
j=1
(
Υ2ϕ1
)j
= 1− Υ
2ϕ1
(
1−Υ2kϕ1)
k (1−Υ2ϕ1)
(32)
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣Al
)
≤ 1− Υ
2ϕ2
(
1−Υ2kϕ2)
k (1−Υ2ϕ2) (33)
Substituting formula (32) and (33) into formula (30), we
have
P
(T )
out|Al ≤ 1−
Υ2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
(
1−Υ2kϕ1) (1−Υ2kϕ2)
k2 (1−Υ2ϕ1) (1−Υ2ϕ2) (34)
Substituting formula (24), (25), (29) and (34) into formula
(23), we have
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P
(T )
out =
n∑
l=0
P
(T )
out|Al · P (Al)
= P
(T )
out|A0 · P (A0) +
k∑
l=1
P
(T )
out|Al · P (Al)
+
n∑
l=k+1
P
(T )
out|Al · P (Al)
≤ 1 · (1− pir2)n
+
(
1−Υϕ1+ϕ2) k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
+
[
1− Υ
2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
(
1−Υ2kϕ1) (1−Υ2kϕ2)
k2 (1−Υ2ϕ1) (1−Υ2ϕ2)
]
·
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
≤ 1−Υϕ1+ϕ2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
− Υ
2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
(
1− Υ2kϕ1) (1−Υ2kϕ2)
k2 (1−Υ2ϕ1) (1−Υ2ϕ2) ·
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
≤ 1−Υϕ1+ϕ2
k∑
l=1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
− Υ
2(ϕ1+ϕ2)
k2
n∑
l=k+1
(
n
l
)(
pir2
)l (
1− pir2)n−l
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability,
we know that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
Thus, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE) (35)
Based on the definition of d0, we denote by G(i)1 the event
that the distance between Ei and the source is less than d0,
and denote by G(i)2 the event that distance between Ei and the
source is lager than or equal to d0. We have
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
= P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)1
)
P
(
G
(i)
1
)
+ P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
P
(
G
(i)
2
)
≤ 1 · 1
2
pid0
2
+ P


|hS,Ei |2
dα
S,Ei∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj,Ei |2
dα
Rj,Ei
≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2


(
1− 1
2
pid0
2
)
of which
P


|hS,Ei |2
dα
S,Ei∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj,Ei |2
dα
Rj,Ei
≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2


≤ P

 |hS,Ei|2d0
−α
Γ
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x−xEi)
2
+(y−yEi)
2
]α
2
dxdy
≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2


where (xEi , yEi) is the coordinate of the eavesdropper Ei.
Γ is the sum of (n− 1) (1− e−τ ) independent exponential
random variables.
From Fig 2 we know that the strongest interference at
eavesdropper Ei happens when Ei is located in the point
(0, 0), while the smallest interference at Ei happens it is
located at four corners of the network region. By considering
the smallest interference at eavesdroppers, we then have
P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
≤ P
( |hS,Ei|2d0−α
Γψ
≥ γE
)
= P
(|hS,Ei|2 ≥ ΓγE · ψ · d0α)
here
ψ =
∫ 0.5
−0.5
∫ 0.5
−0.5
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
Based on the Markov inequality,
P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
≤ EΓ
[
e−ΓγEψd0
α
]
=
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
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Then, we have
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ 1
2
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)(
1− 1
2
pid0
2
)
(36)
Employee the same method, we have
P
(
CRj∗ ,Ei ≥ γE
)
≤ pid02 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
) (37)
Notice that
1
2
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− 1
2
pid0
2
)
= pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)
− 1
2
pid0
2
[
1−
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )]
≤ pid02 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)
(38)
From formula (36), (37) and (38), we can get
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
≤ m
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− pid02
)]
(39)
Substituting formula (39) into formula (2), we have
P
(S)
out ≤
2m
[
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
)]
−
[
m
(
pid0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψd0
α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pid02
))]2
(40)
APPENDIX C
THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION AND PROBABILITY
DENSITY OF H = min
(|hS,Rj∗ |2, |hD,Rj∗ |2)
Let the random variable H = min
(|hS,Rj∗ |2, |hD,Rj∗ |2).
The node Rj∗ is randomly selected from the relay selec-
tion set consisting of system nodes with the first k large
min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2), j = 1, 2, · · · , n. The distribution
function and probability density of H is given by
FH (x) =


1
k
k∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]n−i ] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
and
fH (x) =


1
k
k∑
j=1
[
n!
(j−1)!(n−j)! ·[
1− e−2x]n−j [e−2x]j−1 [2e−2x] ] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
Proof:
Because the random variable H =
min
(|hS,Rj∗ |2, |hD,Rj∗ |2) is the random selection relay from
the first k large random variable min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2),
j = 1, 2, · · · , n. From Appendix D,
FH (x) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
FHlj (x)
fH (x) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
fHlj (x)
According to Appendix E, we have
FH (x) =


1
k
k∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]n−i ] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
and
fH (x) =


1
k
k∑
j=1
[
n!
(j−1)!(n−j)! ·[
1− e−2x]n−j [e−2x]j−1 [2e−2x] ] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
APPENDIX D
THE RANDOMLY SELECTED VARIABLE FROM THE
RANDOM VARIABLE SET
Let X1, · · · , Xn be continuous random variables, with
density fX1(x), · · · , fXn(x) and distribution function
FX1(x), · · · , FXn(x). The random variable, indexed by Y ,
is selected randomly from X1, · · · , Xn. The distribution
function and probability density of Y is given by
FY (y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
FXi(y)
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fY (y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
fXi(y)
Proof:
We assume the s-th random variable is selected as Y , P (s =
i) = 1n , i = 1, · · · , n. Then we have
FY (y) = P (Y ≤ y)
=
n∑
i=1
P (Xs ≤ y|s = i)P (s = i)
=
n∑
i=1
1
n
P (Xs ≤ y|s = i)
=
n∑
i=1
1
n
P (Xi ≤ y)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
FXi(y)
fY (y) = F
′
Y (y)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
F ′Xi(y)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fXi(y)
APPENDIX E
THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION AND PROBABILITY
DENSITY OF THE k-TH LARGEST RANDOM VARIABLE
The |hA,B|2 is path-loss between any node A and B
with the Rayleigh fading, and is exponentially distributed
with E
[|hA,B|2] = 1. The min (|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2), j =
1, 2, · · · , n, are n random variables in which the j-th largest
random variable is denoted by H lj . The distribution function
and probability density of the random variable H lj , j =
1, 2, · · · , n, are given by
FHlj (x) =


n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
) [
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]n−i x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
fHlj (x) =


n!
(j−1)!(n−j)! ·[
1− e−2x]n−j [e−2x]j−1 [2e−2x] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
Proof:
Because the |hA,B|2 is exponentially distributed with
E
[|hA,B|2] = 1 between any node A and B, according to or-
der statistics in [32], we can get the distribution function of the
min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2) for each relay Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n,
indexed by Hj , as following,
fHj (x) =
{
2e−2x x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
FHj (x) =
{
1− e−2x x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
According to order statistics in [32], The distribution func-
tion and probability density of the j-th smallest in Hj ,
j = 1, 2, · · · , n, indexed by Hsj , are given by
FHsj (x) =


n∑
i=j
(
n
i
) [
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]n−i x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
fHsj (x) =


n!
(j−1)!(n−j)! ·[
1− e−2x]j−1 [e−2x]n−j [2e−2x] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
Since the j-th largest, indexed by H lj , is equal to the
(n− j + 1)-th smallest in Hj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, we should
have
FHlj (x) = FH
s
n−j+1 (x)
=


n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
) [
1− e−2x]i [e−2x]n−i x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
fHlj (x) = fH
s
n−j+1 (x)
=


n!
(j−1)!(n−j)! ·[
1− e−2x]n−j [e−2x]j−1 [2e−2x] x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
REFERENCES
[1] N. Sathya, ”Two-hop forwarding in wireless networks,” Dissertation for
the degree of Doctor of philosophy, Polytechnic University, 2006.
[2] A. Dalalah, ”A Dynamic Sliding Load Balancing Strategy in Distributed
Systems,” The International Arab Journal of Information Technology,
Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.178-182, 2006.
[3] A. Hac, T. Johnson, ”A Study of Dynamic Load Balancing in a Dis-
tributed System,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM conference on
Communications architectures and protocols (SIGCOMM 86), pp.348-
356, 1986.
[4] M.I. Gumel, N. Faruk and A.A. Ayeni, ”Routing with Load Balancing
in Wireless Mesh Networks,” International Journal of Current Research,
vol.3, no.7, pp.87-92, 2011.
[5] P.H. Hsiao, A. Hwang, H.T. Kung and D. Vlah, ”Load-Balancing Rout-
ing for Wireless Access Networks,” In Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM
2001, pp.986-995, 2001.
[6] J. Gao and L. Zhang, ”Load Balanced Short Path Routing in Wireless
Networks,” In Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2004, pp.1099-1108,
2004.
15
[7] G. Trajcevski, O. Ghica, P. Scheuermann, M. Zuniga, R. Schubotz, M.
Hauswirth, ”Improving the Energy Balance of Field-based Routing in
Wireless Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings of the Global Commu-
nications Conference, (GLOBECOM 2010), pp.1-5, 2010.
[8] D.Wajgi and N.V. Thakur, ”Load Balancing Based Approach to Improve
Lifetime of Wireless Sensor Network,” International Journal of Wireless
and Mobile Networks (IJWMN), Vol. 4, No. 4, pp.155-167, 2012.
[9] D. Wajgi and N.V. Thakur, ”Load Balancing Algorithms in Wireless
Sensor Network: A Survey,” International Journal of Computer Networks
and Wireless Communications (IJCNWC),Vol.2, No4, pp.456-460, 2012.
[10] J. Zhang, ”Secure and Load-Balanced Routing in Wireless Sensor
Networks,” In International Conference on Information Technology and
Computer Science, 3rd (ITCS 2011). pp.105-108, 2011.
[11] S. Ozdemir, ”Secure Load Balancing via Hierarchical Data Aggregation
in Heterogeneous Sensor Networks,” Journal of Information Science and
Engineering vol.25, pp.1691-1705, 2009.
[12] J. Talbot and D. Welsh, ”Complexity and Crytography : An Introduc-
tion,”, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[13] A. Joux, ”A Tutorial on High Performance Computing Applied to
Cryptanalysis,”, EUROCRYPT 2012, pp.1-7, 2012.
[14] A. D. Wyner, ”The wire-tap channel,” The Bell System Technical
Journal, vol.54, no.8, pp.1355-1387, 1975.
[15] S. Vasudevan, D. Goeckel and D. F. Towsley, ”Security-capacity trade-
off in large wireless networks using keyless secrecy,” In the eleventh
ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and
computing (MobiHoc 2010), pp.21-30, 2010.
[16] O.O. Koyluoglu, C.E. Koksal and H.E. Gamal, ”On Secrecy Capacity
Scaling in Wireless Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information The-
ory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp.3000-3015, 2012.
[17] L. Dong, Z. Han, A.P. Petropulu, and H.V. Poor, ”Secure wireless com-
munications via cooperation,” in Proc. 46th Annual Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing, pp. 1132-1138, 2008.
[18] L. Dong, Z. Han, A.P. Petropulu, and H.V. Poor, ”Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp.1875-1888, 2010.
[19] D. Goeckel, S. Vasudevan, D. Towsley, S. Adams, Z. Ding and K.
Leung, ”Everlasting Secrecy in Two-Hop Wireless Networks Using
Artificial Noise Generation from Relays,” In proceeding of International
Technology Alliance Collaboration System (ACITA 2011), 2011.
[20] D. Goeckel, S. Vasudevan, D. Towsley, S. Adams, Z. Ding and K. Leung,
”Artificial noise generation from cooperative relays for everlasting
secrecy in two-hop wireless networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol.29, no.10 pp.2067-2076, 2011.
[21] C. Capar, D. Goeckel, B. Liu and D. Towsley, ”Secret Communication in
Large Wireless Networks without Eavesdropper Location Information,”
In Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2012, pp.1152-1160, 2012.
[22] Z. Ding, K. Leung, D. Goeckel and D. Towsley, ”Opportunistic Relaying
for Secrecy Communications: Cooperative Jamming vs Relay Chatting,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol.10, no.6, pp.1725-
1729, 2011.
[23] C. Leow, C. Capar, D. Goeckel, and K. Leung, ”A Two-Way Secrecy
Scheme for the Scalar Broadcast Channel with Internal Eavesdroppers,”
In the Forty Fifth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and
Computers (ASILOMAR 2011), pp.1840-1844, 2011.
[24] C. Capar and D. Goeckel, ”Network Coding for Facilitating Secrecy in
Large Wireless Networks,” In 46th Annual Conference on Information
Sciences and Systems (CISS 2012), pp.1-6, 2012.
[25] M. Dehghan, D. Goeckel, M. Ghaderi and Z. Ding, ”Energy Efficiency
of Cooperative Jamming Strategies in Secure Wireless Networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol.11, no.9, pp.3025-3029,
2012.
[26] A. Sheikholeslami, D. Goeckel, H. Pishro-Nik and D. Towsley, ”Phys-
ical Layer Security from Inter-Session Interference in Large Wireless
Networks,” In Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2012, pp.1179-1187,
2012.
[27] S. Vasudevan, S. Adams, D. Goeckel, Z. Ding, D. Towsley and K. Leung,
”Multi-User Diversity for Secrecy in Wireless Networks,” In proceeding
of Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA 2010), pp.1-9,
2010.
[28] J. Li, A. Petropulu and S. Weber, ”On Cooperative Relaying Schemes for
Wireless Physical Layer Security,” http://arxiv.org/pdf/1001.1389v1.pdf ,
2010.
[29] Y. Shen, X.Jiang, J. ma, ”Secure and Reliable Transmission with Co-
operative Relays in Two-Hop Wireless Networks,” http://arxiv.org/pdf/,
2012.
[30] Y. Shen, X.Jiang, J. ma, ”Exploring Relay Cooperation for Se-
cure and Reliable Transmission in Two-Hop Wireless Networks,”
http://arxiv.org/pdf/, 2012.
[31] S.L. Cheong and M. Hellman ”The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE
Transaction Information Theory, vol.24, no.4, pp.451-456, 1978.
[32] H.David, ”Order Statistics,” Wiley, New York, 1980.
